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ABSTRACT
In the classic approach the public sphere is a space, where the common debate takes place, 
where common issues are discussed, often through the media and on its forum. This sphere, 
on a national level, exists in every political system. The question is, is it also possible to speak 
about a common public sphere on a European scale? The process of European integration after 
all, deals with countries of varied languages, cultures, and traditions concerning the political 
debate. Is it possible, that a mutual (European) public sphere may arise in countries with varied 
media systems and journalistic traditions? And, fi nally, can this sphere arise – what is espe-
cially important today – within countries of varied interpretations of and links to democratic 
standards? In this context the problem of the fragmentation of the communication environment 
and its impact on the condition of the public sphere takes on a new dimension. The goal of this 
article is an analysis of the conditions limiting the creation and development of a European 
public sphere.
Keywords: European public sphere, media and European integration, international political 
communication
1 This publication is a modifi ed version of a chapter entitled “Rola mediów w międzynarodowej 
komunikacji politycznej” [The role of the media in international political communication], in Ag-
nieszka Szymańska’s monograph “Europa dziennikarzy. Dyplomacja mediów a (post)narodowa Eu-
ropa w świetle wypowiedzi niemieckich dziennikarzy prasowych” [A Europe of Journalists. Media 
Diplomacy and a (post)National Europe in the View of German Print Journalists], which was pub-
lished 2016 by Jagiellonian University Printing House.
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Introduction
European history is the story of the coexistence of a multiethnic mosaic of natio-
nalities, which in different epochs to a greater or lesser extent lived, cooperated, 
competed or fought with each other. This is a rich, colorful, but often also tragic 
history. The disaster of the two world wars, which began as European confl i-
cts, became the cause for the idea of European cooperation, which would allow 
the peaceful coexistence of European countries and their stable economic deve-
lopment, as well as the strengthening of democratic standards and humanistic 
values. Today, however, the process of European integration is at a crossroads. 
The crisis of the Eurozone, refugee problem, threat of terrorism have all resulted 
in an increase of national resentments and prejudices deftly fanned by numerous 
populist politicians appearing today. Looking at Europe today it is clear that once 
again there is more that divides the Europeans than unites them. All of this means 
that it is exceptionally diffi cult to predict the course of events and thereby also to 
foresee the future of the European Union.
In the classical approach, as mentioned in the foreword to this book, the 
public sphere is a space where the ‘common reality’ will be constituted. In this 
sense ‘public’ concerns the world surrounding, as long as it includes the ‘com-
mon’ space, which is different from the ‘private’ space possessed only by indi-
viduals. This is therefore the space for common activities of different actors and 
subjects (groups as well as individuals), the space where ‘common’ issues are 
discussed, where the proposed solutions of ‘common’ problems, undertakings, 
social and political projects are sought and presented. This sphere, on a national 
level, exists in every political system. However, is it possible to speak about 
a common public sphere on a European scale? The process of European integra-
tion after all, deals with countries of varied languages, cultures, and traditions 
concerning the political debate. Moreover, the public sphere is quite often real-
ized through the intercession and on the forum of the media. How can the mu-
tual public space arise in countries with varied media systems and journalistic 
traditions? Can this mutual space unite countries with varied political cultures, 
and – what is especially important today – varied interpretations and links to 
democratic standards? Maybe the lack of this common public sphere is one of 
the main reasons of the current European problems? In this context the prob-
lem of the fragmentation of the communication environment and its impact on 
the condition of the public sphere takes on a new dimension. The goal of this 
article is an analysis of the conditions limiting the creation and development of 
a European public sphere. The considerations presented here are based on the 
results of research, conducted by me in 2015 with German print journalists, as 
part of a project entitled: “A German Europe or a European Germany? Media 
Diplomacy and a (post)National Europe on the Example of the European Politi-
cal Discourse in Germany” realized thanks to the cooperation of the Institute of 
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Journalism, Media and Social Communication at the Jagiellonian University in 
Krakow, as well as the Institute of Media Studies (Institut für Publizistik) at the 
Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz.2
The signifi cance of the media in international communication
The presence of the mass media has a different signifi cance for the process of 
international communication in various historical periods. The signifi cance of the 
mass media evolved and was always a derivative of the level of technological 
development.3 The special role and the basic, primary signifi cance of the media in 
international communication results from their possibility of transmitting infor-
mation from places which are geographically distant from the place of residence 
of the recipient. In the case of events abroad the domestic recipients often don’t 
have any other information sources than the mass media, nor usually can they 
revert to their own personal experience or get fi rst-hand information from others. 
The perception of events taking place abroad is therefore infl uenced by the qua-
lity of the media coverage of these events. The media’s infl uence appears on two 
levels: on the content level by the selection of covered events and on the image 
forming level by the choice of presentation context and interpretation of the con-
sequences of covering events.4 The media image is therefore the springboard for 
the future attitude of individuals and public opinion to the events covered by the 
media, and later also for the political activities, taken in fi elds connected to these 
events.5 This and the fact, that the message of the contemporary media reaches 
political actors very often faster than the information sent through traditional di-
2 The project included an analysis on three levels. First of all, research was conducted on the 
attitudes and opinions of journalists as authors of the media content/coverage regarding Europe, 
the results of which were presented in a monograph [see footnote 1]. The second part of the project 
contained an analysis of the attitudes and opinions of German politicians on all levels (as traditional 
political actors) on the subject of the role of the media in the European debate. The results will be 
presented in a future publication of this cycle. The third stage of the research incorporated an content 
analysis of selected German media, the goal of which was (and still is – this part of research project 
has to be expanded), to establish to what sphere and in what context of which events, pro or anti-
European rhetoric is present in the coverage of the German media.
3 Concerning the subject of the evolution of the mutual relations between the media and poli-
tics in the context of international communication and phenomenon of media diplomacy see also: 
A. Hess, A. Szymańska (2009). Pomost medialny. Rola mediów w międzynarodowej komunikacji 
politycznej na przykładzie relacji polsko-niemieckich. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 
Kraków, pp. 28–37; A. Szymańska (2009). Dyplomacja mediów – wizerunek problematyki wypę-
dzonych na przykładzie wybranych publikacji prasowych ostatniej dekady (dzienniki Rzeczpospolita 
i Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung). Zeszyty Prasoznawcze, 1–2, pp. 50–58.
4 S.N. Soroka (2003). Media, Public Opinion, Foreign Policy. The Harvard International Jour-
nal of Press/Politics, 8(1), pp. 42–43.
5 J. Ramaprasad (1983). Media Diplomacy: In Search of a Defi nition. International Communica-
tion Gazette, 31, p. 71.
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plomatic channels constitutes the position of the mass media in modern diploma-
cy and foreign politics.6
While the fl ow of goods, connected with the economic sphere of the process of 
European integration, like capital, goods and services, labor and others, has been 
effi ciently carried out in the EU for many years (even if we take into account the 
latest problems of the eurozone), there is still no indication of a similar effi cient-
ly functioning exchange of political media information.7 This sphere is closely 
linked with language as an element bearing national culture, which is a more ef-
fi cient barrier of exchange between the Europeans than purely economic culture 
and the obligatory model of entrepreneurship accepted by a given nation.
The multitude of languages existing in Europe (which are, as mentioned above, 
not only a code of communication, but also a key element bearing national culture 
of specifi c societies) is a very effi cient barrier to the appearance of a space for the 
common European discourse – i.e. European public sphere – as a common forum 
for the exchange of thoughts and information. Without such a forum it is very dif-
fi cult for the Europeans to know and to understand each other. This understanding 
would be however necessary, if they were to have and feel a common European 
identity, which could be a connecting element, a common denominator of all mem-
bers of the UE in a globalized world. The European identity is understood in this 
context according to the defi nition of Jerzy Mikułowski Pomorski as an awareness 
of values linking Europeans and is equivalent to a feeling of unity among those 
nations, which comprise the UE.8 This defi nition is also concurrent with the idea 
proposed by Jürgen Habermas, who referred to the concept of Peter Graf von Kiel-
mansegg, according to whom European identity is awareness of an obligation to 
the European common good.9
European public sphere – concept and defi nition
European and domestic politics and the media affect each other (and the members 
of European societies as well) in a communication space, which in professional lit-
6 During his term of offi ce as Secretary of Defense in the administration of George Bush, Dick 
Cheney, often admitted for example that he got important and essential information more quickly 
from CNN than from the US diplomatic corps. See S. Hess, M. Kalb (eds.) (2003). The Media and 
the War on Terrorism. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., p. 63.
7 See: H.J. Kleinsteuber (2004). Strukturwandel der europäischen Öffentlichkeit? Der Öffent-
lichkeitsbegriff von Jürgen Habermas und die European Public Sphere. In: L.M. Hagen (Hrsg.). Eu-
ropäische Union und mediale Öffentlichkeit. Theoretische Perspektiven und empirische Befunde zur 
Rolle der Medien im europäischen Einigungsprozess. Robert von Halem Verlag, Köln 2004, p. 35.
8 J. Mikułowski Pomorski (2003). Komunikacja międzykulturowa. Wprowadzenie. Wyd. II. 
Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej w Krakowie, Kraków, p. 90. See also: F. Gołembski (2005). 
Tożsamość europejska (aspekty teoretyczne). In: idem (red.). Tożsamość europejska. Biblioteka Eu-
ropejska, 1. INP UW, Warszawa, pp. 13–67.
9 J. Habermas (1993). Obywatelstwo a tożsamość narodowa. Rozważania nad przyszłością Eu-
ropy. Tłum. B. Markiewicz. Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa, p. 19.
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erature is called the European public sphere, eventually the European public space 
(ger. europäische Öﬀ entlichkeit). The phenomenon of the European public sphere 
is understood and described by various authors in a different manner. Some of them 
understand the European public sphere as a communication space, others as a net-
work of communication links, and still others as a communication system or com-
munication forum or, at least, as a process of communication of European society.10 
According to the defi nition of Hans-Jürgen Trenz, which referred to the concepts of 
Jürgen Habermas and Bernhard Peters, public sphere is an intersubjectively divided, 
communicatively structured space for mutual observation.11 However, the public 
sphere must not be understood neither on the domestic nor the European level as 
a monolithic and uniform space for the exchange of the political views.12 It is a very 
structurally diversifi ed space, which is composed of many smaller spaces, where the 
all debates take place. That is why in practice in many empirical analyses the public 
sphere is operationalized as the intensity/density of communication activities, un-
dertaken in a given area, by various types of actors. In the context of the European 
integration process, many authors call attention to the signifi cantly less intensity 
of communication activities in the trans-national public sphere (European), than 
occurs on the national level, which is not conducive neither to the creation of a Eu-
ropean identity, nor a legitimization of the policies of European institutions.13
Signifi cance of the European public sphere
The signifi cance of the European public sphere for European politics and the 
process of European integration has a similar weight as the national (domestic) 
public sphere for domestic politics. The signifi cance is connected to and results 
from the political and social functions and roles of the media, especially in the 
fi elds of legitimization of politics and integration of society. That is why the ran-
ge and quality of the European public sphere is often connected and appraised 
with the quality of the democratic standards of the European Union itself. The 
low level of presence of the European public sphere is evaluated as an essential 
detriment of the democratic standards of EU institutions. Therefore the defi cit 
of the European public sphere is taken as the defi cit of democracy of the EU.14
10 M. Latzer, F. Saurwein (2006). Europäisierung durch Medien: Ansätze und Erkenntnisse der 
Öffentlichkeitsforschung. In: W.R. Langenbucher, M. Latzer (Hrsg.). Europäische Öffentlichkeit und 
medialer Wandel. Eine transdisziplinäre Perspektive. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesba-
den, p. 11.
11 H.-J. Trenz (2000). Korruption und politischer Skandal in der EU. Auf dem Weg zu einer euro-
päischen politischen Öffentlichkeit. In: M. Bach (Hrsg.). Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaf-
ten. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft 40. Westdeutscher Verlag, 
Wiesbaden, p. 333.
12 J. Habermas, op. cit., p. 20.
13 M. Latzer, F. Saurwein, op. cit., p. 11.
14 Ibidem, p. 10.
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In the foreword to a publication15 dedicated to the medial public sphere in 
the European Union, a German media scientist, Lutz M. Hagen, called atten-
tion to expectations, which are commonly bound in the EU with the media as 
an antidote for all the democratic defi cits of the EU institutions: “Great hope is 
placed in the mass media, according to them the media are in a position to solve 
the problem of the democratic defi cits in European Union. In their social func-
tion as the fourth estate the media should support the common identity of EU 
citizens. With the help of extensive and deep information they should allow the 
appearance of a transnational discourse, which would help the democratization 
of Europe and the legitimization of the EU”.16 But are the media really able to 
fulfi ll these expectations?
The role of the media in the process of creating the European public 
sphere – research traditions
In theoretical refl ections on the signifi cance of the European public sphere, the 
benchmark for the specifi c concepts are the different social functions of the me-
dia, to which the authors bestow the highest rank. The highest level of attention 
is given by researchers, which is understandable, to the legitimizing and integrat-
ing functions of the media.17 That is why in empirical research on the European 
public sphere, which was conducted in the area of theories of representative lib-
eral democracy, the attention of the authors is focused on the visibility of the 
European Union, its institutions and actors, and the subject of European integra-
tion in the media content as well, eventually factors, which make this visibility 
stronger or weaker. In light of this research tradition the attention of the media is 
then a necessary condition for guarantying of transparency and control of politics 
on the European level. The signifi cance of the media in this research tradition 
means the control of the European institutions. In turn, in the research, which 
was conducted in the fi eld of pluralistic-participative theories, the signifi cance of 
the European public sphere as a space for representative and maximal diversifi ed 
spectrum of opinions is stressed. The opinion shouldn’t be limited to main politi-
cal actors, but should include also such peripheral actors as citizens, NGOs etc. 
In this research tradition the role of the media is to assure a forum of opinions 
exchange for broadest spectrum of actors possible, which is in this tradition the 
most important indicator of the signifi cance of the media in the European debate. 
In the center of interest of the research conducted in the area of theories of delib-
erative democracy are the practice of the process of transnational communication, 
the factors infl uencing its quality and the quality of the discourse about European 
15 L.M. Hagen (Hrsg.), op. cit.
16 Ibidem, p. 7.
17 M. Latzer, F. Saurwein, op. cit., p. 12.
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political issues. The signifi cance of the media in this research tradition results in 
the creation of a space for transnational communication.18
The quality of media content about European issues
As many research results show, among them also the results presented in a mono-
graph edited by Lutz M. Hagen, which – nota bene – were conducted before the 
eastern EU expansion in 2004, the media can’t fulfi ll the expectations, which are 
placed in them in context of the European integration. The media content about 
European issues is inadequate to the signifi cance and impact of the European 
politics and decisions on the day to day life of EU member states citizens.19 The 
media content is very often also reduced to the economical dimension of Europe-
an integration, and within specifi c member states is also presented almost solely 
through the perspective of benefi ts for this particular country.20 The platform for 
the creation of the common European discourse appears only sporadically and is 
usually connected with some kind of diffi cult events on the international stage 
like the war in Kosovo, or lately confl icts in Ukraine and Syria, or such events 
within the EU, which are exceptionally controversial (for example the Greek cri-
sis, refugees from war torn countries, Brexit). In this situation it is no wonder, 
that the expansion of the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013, which enlarged the internal 
discourse of the EU by the next 10 national discourses of the new member states, 
exacerbated the identity crisis in the EU.
The barriers and limitations of the media in the creation of the 
European discourse
Hartmut Weßler,21 the author of refl ections on the structure and functions of the 
European public sphere in the aforementioned publication edited by Hagen, 
maintains the position that the abilities of the media are more limited than the 
expectations commonly placed in them. It is because the European public sphe-
re doesn’t exist in a singular form. It exists only in the plural and has the form 
of a polyphonic choir created by the discourses of all the national media in the 
member states. The EU doesn’t have any common, transnational media to offer 
18 Ibidem, pp. 13–14.
19 L.M. Hagen (Hrsg.), op. cit., pp. 7–8. In this monograph see also follow articles: J. Peter 
(2004). Kaum vorhanden, thematisch homogen und eher negativ – Die alltägliche Fernsehberich-
terstattung über die Europäische Union im internationalen Vergleich. In: ibidem, pp. 146–161, and 
M. Kalantzi (2004). Europa in der Tagespresse Deutschlands und Griechenlands – Ergebnisse einer 
empirischen Untersuchung. In: ibidem, pp. 178–194.
20 K.M. Hagen (Hrsg.), pp. 7–8.
21 H. Weßler (2004). Kulturelle und politische Integration durch Medien? Theoretische Über-
legungen zur Europäisierung von Öffentlichkeit. In: ibidem, pp. 13–28.
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its citizens.22 The forming of the European public sphere was and is therefore 
a process, which takes place only spottily and temporarily, it means only when 
the media in different member states are covering the same European issues, and 
thereby the specifi c national (domestic) discourses get for a short time the same 
common denominator. However, such kind of situations are rather an exception 
and not a rule and are connected to the events or actors, which are attractive 
for the media according to the media’s logic (news values), i.e. which range and 
signifi cance are extraordinary, arouse exceptionally emotions and so on. Nevert-
heless this is usually not favorable for this common denominator, and further also 
for the positive character of the media’s message concerning the European Union. 
These considerations allowed Hartmut Weßler to propose a thesis, which is rather 
unpleasant for the future of the EU, that “confl ict keeps the European public sphe-
re alive”.23 This phenomenon is worrying, because the media are very important 
for social integration. The mechanism of integration realized with the help of the 
media means including citizens, who are taking the role of media recipients, into 
the public life taking place in a given public sphere. If therefore this sporadically 
appearing media content about the EU, which could become the European ‘com-
mon denominator’ is constantly negative, than the expected social integration is 
not possible. The only things, which can unite all the Europeans in this situation, 
are skepticism and disbelief in the success of the European integration project. 
The latest debates, which are taking place on the media forum in all European 
countries, concern the Greek crisis, Ukrainian confl ict or a refugee problem etc., 
seem to confi rm the thesis of Weßler.
Not only does the negativism of the media content ‘common denominator’ not 
serve the creation of the European public sphere. Not favourable for the appear-
ance of the European public sphere is also the ‘national’ colored interpretation 
frame of the media coverage (framing) concerning European issues. As the results 
of the content analyses, which were conducted by numerous authors in different 
EU countries during the debates about the European constitution and Lisbon Trea-
ty, show, the individual national debates indeed took up at a similar time period 
similar issues, however they showed them in different interpretation frames and 
in context of different discussions taking place in a given member state, which 
could not really support the transnational exchange of European ideas.24 Beyond 
that there is also a different perception of the benefi ts taken from the presence 
22 The existing European media (mostly in English), like the Brussel’s weekly “European Voice”, 
the economic daily “Wall Street Europe” or the TV information channel “Euronews” (available in 
English, but also in French, German, Spanish and Italian) didn’t gain popularity by the wide spectrum 
of European citizens and are still only an exclusive offer for a small group of professionals. See: H.J. 
Kleinsteuber, op. cit., p. 37.
23 H. Weßler, op. cit., p. 24.
24 D. Lichtenstein, Ch. Eilders (2015). Konstruktionen europäischer Identität in den medialen 
Debatten zur EU-Verfassung. Ein Inhaltsanalytischer Vergleich von fünf EU-Staaten. Publizistik, 60, 
p. 281. The authors recall the research results of Silke Adam (2007), Claudia Butter (2009), Ellen 
Dietzsch (2009), Melanie Tatur (2009) and Paul Statham & Hans-Jürgen Trenz (2013).
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of the EU in the media content in specifi c member states. In this context this 
‘national’ coloring is visible in the orientation of European narrations, presented 
in the national media discourses in EU member states. In Germany and Spain 
for instance the process of European integration is seen in the media discourse 
in a context of the diffi cult past of these countries and in this way also as an op-
portunity for a unique historical rehabilitation. In turn, in Great Britain the media 
observe the development of the integration process mostly through the perspec-
tive of economic cooperation, whereby the frame of reference is the idea of the 
British Commonwealth. In Poland and other countries of this region membership 
in EU structures is taken as a chance for economic and political development or – 
like in the case of Bulgaria – as a method for compensating the weakness of their 
own political system.25
The factors limiting the creation of the European public sphere
The refl ections concerning the circumstances, which have to be fulfi lled for the ap-
pearance of the common European public sphere, were also conducted by another 
German researcher, Jürgen Gerhards.26 Among fi ve conditions, which are in his 
opinion absolutely crucial, he named in fi rst place the existence in all member 
states of such legal regulations, which guarantee freedom of speech and the inde-
pendence of the media. The second condition was access to effective and effi cient 
information transfer technologies. The third condition was the presence in Europe 
of an interested audience (recipients), who actively use the media content and is 
able to take part in the European discussion. The fourth condition was the pro-
fessionalization of such media professions like especially journalism and media 
management. The last condition, which should permit the appearance of the Euro-
pean public sphere in the opinion of Gerhards was the creation of the category of 
collective political actors, who would take a voice on the European public forum 
and through promoting on this forum their own election programs they would 
neutralize, or at least weaken, the existing barrier of the borders of national public 
spheres. What is interesting, in the time, when he published his article (2000), 
Gerhards saw the obstacles for the appearance of the European public sphere only 
within the third and the fi fth conditions, which were mentioned above. In case of 
the third condition his doubts were aroused by the problem of the aforementioned 
multiplicity of languages in use in Europe. However, the real barrier was in his 
opinion fi rst the fi fth condition, because the borders of national public spheres are 
identical with the territorial borders of specifi c member states, inside of which all 
25 Ibidem.
26 J. Gerhards (2000). Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entste-
hung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. In: M. Bach (Hrsg.). Transnationale Integrationsprozesse in 
Europa. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft. Westdeutscher Verlag, 
Opladen, pp. 277–305.
10 AGNIESZKA SZYMAŃSKA
EU
R
O
PE
JS
K
A
 S
FE
R
A
 P
U
B
LI
C
ZN
A
the political elections are held. That is why the collective political actors, who are 
present on the European forum, send their message not to all Europeans, but only 
to a specifi c national audience.27
From the current point of view the appearance of the European public sphere 
seems to be even more diffi cult, and the spectrum of obstacles signifi cantly ex-
ceeds the two conditions, which bothered Gerhards.
The recent changes, which took places in the fi eld of legal regulations con-
cerned the functioning of mass media in several member states, especially in the 
region of Central Europe (Hungary, Poland and others) or the question of media 
ownership (Czech Republic, Slovakia, but also many states of the so called old 
Europe), also caused the fi rst condition named by Gerhards to be questioned.28 
Beyond that also the changes on the media market itself evoke fears, if there is 
today a space for guarantying condition four. The level of professionalism of jour-
nalists and media workers and the quality of media functioning (media content) 
are constantly linked with the economic sphere of media functioning29 and unfor-
tunately the media have been for many years affl icted by a deep fi nancial crisis. 
Also different are the characteristics of specifi c national media markets and the 
traditions of journalism in a given culture/country. According to Jeremy Tunsall 
for instance the differences between political journalism in Greece and Germany 
are just huge. In 2002, when he conducted his research, in Germany there were 
still a very strong public media, and the German media market was character-
ized by a strong position and high readership of newspapers, while in Greece the 
public media were very weak and the market of the print media was very limited 
and dominated by afternoon tabloids. The media market in Italy and France were 
also completely different from that in Germany and the Scandinavian one was 
completely different from the Spanish one and so on.30 And these are only a few 
examples of the rich diversity found in European media markets.31 No less impor-
tant is the reigning climate of discouragement, exhaustion and inertia within the 
EU, which caused lack of interest and positive involvement of specifi c European 
audiences in EU issues (see Brexit).
Whatever will happen to all other conditions named by Gerhards, the multi-
plicity of languages and cultures of the EU would remain the factors, which will 
constantly and – as it seems – rather unchangeably stop/block the appearance of 
the European public sphere as a collective, united public space for the mutual 
discussion about common European issues. Also the signifi cance of the nation 
27 Ibidem, pp. 289–292.
28 See the results of pilot research project Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 (Monitoring Risk for 
Media Pluralism in EU MEmber States). Data from 2015 and concerning 19 member states [http://
monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2015/results/; 16.11.2016].
29 A. Szymańska (2017). Dziennikarstwo w epoce nowych mediów – przykład Niemiec. Zeszyty 
Prasoznawcze, 1, pp. 201–213.
30 J. Tunstall (2002). Trends in news media and political journalism. In: R. Kuhn, E. Neveu 
(eds.). Political Journalism. New Challenges, New Practices. Routledge, London–New York, p. 231.
31 See the results of Media Pluralism Monitor 2015…
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state will not weaken, as has been proven by the latest events on the European 
stage (confl ict about refugees quotas, rising popularity of national populists etc.). 
As Kazimierz Łastawski has noted, on one hand the national states do delegate 
a huge part of their own competence to the European and local level, but on the 
other, they still fulfi ll very important political, economic and – above all – cul-
tural functions.32 All this indicates, that the signifi cance of the national state will 
once again increase.33 That is why some researchers are seeking the space for 
the appearance of the European public sphere at the intersection of the public 
media discourses of the individual member states.34 The most popular form of 
this kind of intersection is in the opinion of these researchers the mutual leaking 
of information published in the media in another member state. Therefore the 
public discourses of different states connect with each other always, when one of 
the domestic media is quoting (or is referring in any other form) to the content 
of a medium from another EU member state). By so doing this medium became 
for its recipients a unique translator of the public discourse taking place abroad 
and is eliminating the existing linguistic and cultural barriers, which the majority 
of the recipients couldn’t overcome without the help of this medium. In this way 
the media in Europe, despite the diversity of their communication codes and the 
whole structural barriers mentioned above, are still the basic and key institution, 
which has the necessary potential and infrastructure for building the European 
‘network’ linking public spheres of the individual member states. That is why 
those authors, instead of searching for any other form of common media offer for 
all the EU citizens as a platform for the creation of the European public sphere and 
the common European identity, propose to concentrate on seeking and promoting 
such forms of coexistence of the national public spheres, which would link them 
in a unique network. The key question, which should be asked is in their opinion 
if and under what conditions the public discourses of the individual member states 
can penetrate and infl uence each other.35
32 K. Łastawski (2004). Polskość w Europie. Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej / Departament 
Wychowania i Promocji Obronności, Polskie Przedsiębiorstwo Geodezyjno-Kartografi czne, War-
szawa, p. 8.
33 See: Zurück zur Nation. Wie die Rechtspopulisten das politische Klima in Europa verän-
dern, Frankf urter Allgemeine Woche, 9.12.2016, No. 50; H. Schuman, Europa nach dem Brexit: 
Starke nationale Regierungen machen die EU unsozial. Der Tagespiegel, 5.07.2016, [http://www.
tagesspiegel.de/politik/europa-nach-dem-brexit-starke-nationale-regierungen-machen-die-eu-unso-
zial/13829186.html; 16.11.2016]. The same opinion presented Donald Tusk, see: Kropka nad ‘i’ / 
TVN24, 20.12.2016, www.tvn24.pl.
34 See H. Wessler (2002). Multiple Differenzierung und kommunikative Integration. Symboli-
sche Gemeinschaften und Medien. In: K. Imhof, O. Jarren, R. Blum (Hrsg.). Integration und Medien. 
Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, pp. 56–76. Also see: K. Eder, C. Kantner (2000). Transnationale 
Resonanzstrukturen in Europa. Eine Kritik der Rede von Öffentlichkeitsdefi zit. In: M. Bach (Hrsg.). 
Transnationale Integrationsprozesse…, pp. 306–331.
35 H. Weßler, op. cit., pp. 20, 22–23.
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Examples of media initiatives for creating the common European 
public sphere
An another form (even if only substitutive) of the European public sphere, which 
with the help of the mass media could support the appearance of bonds, commit-
ments and a sense of community among the inhabitants of EU member countries, 
are different kinds of open political and social debates organized by the media. 
An example of this kind of event could be the discussion organized in 2013 by 
a few European newspapers (El País, The Guardian, Gazeta Wyborcza, La Stam-
pa, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Le Monde), where six famous publicists were asked 
how the European crisis should be overcome.36 The editorial staffs of the German 
weekly Die Zeit or the French daily Le Monde also organized several meetings,37 
during which the European politicians representing various national viewpoints, 
presented their opinions about current European issues or their own visions of the 
future of European integration. The value of these meetings was, that they didn’t 
speak about it in the silence of their offi ces but on the forum of the mass media. 
Thanks to this the audience of the medium, which organized the meeting, gained 
a direct opportunity to see the way of thinking about Europe in other European 
countries. The latest Polish-German duel organized between the 13 and 17 of June 
2016 by the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza together with the German Zeit Online 
is also an example of this kind of debate. The formula of the duel foresaw the pub-
lication in both countries of the answers to fi ve rounds of rather very controversial 
questions concerning Polish-German relations. The goal was to make clear to the 
domestic audience from which perspective the neighbors look at these problems.38 
36 See: J. Zielonka (2014). Koniec Unii Europejskiej? Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 
Warszawa, p. 73.
37 H.J. Kleinsteuber, op. cit., pp. 38–39.
38 The questions of round 1 were: Germany is responsible for its own immigration crisis. […] 
Why does Germany want the other EU countries to pay for their mistake? │Why are the Poles so 
intolerant of other religions, especially Islam, even though there are hardly any Muslims in Poland? 
[http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,20233612, sparing-polska-niemcy-wyborcza-kontra-zeit-online-po.html;
16.11.2016]. The questions of round 2 were: Why are the Germans surprised at Brexit? The Eu-
ropeans have had enough of German domination│Poland only takes from the EU. Where is Polish 
solidarity? [http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,20237674,sparing-polska-niemcy-wyborcza-kontra-zeit-on-
line-po.html; 16.11.2016]. The questions of round 3 were: The Germans declare they are supporting 
Ukraine, but they are doing business with the Russians behind their backs │ The Poles are so proud 
about their natural environment, but they are polluting everything with their coal fi red electric power 
plants. [http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,20243398,sparing-polska-niemcy-wyborcza-kontra-zeit-online-
po.html; 16.11.2016]. The questions of round 4 were: Why do the Germans treat the Poles only
as a cheap labor force? │ And why have the Poles, who created their own model of democracy, 
chosen a party which wants to destroy it? [http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,20251406,sparing-polska-
niemcy-wyborcza-kontra-zeit-online-po.html; 16.11.2016]. The questions of round 5 were: Why 
don’t the Poles have their own political representatives in Germany?│And why are the Poles, who 
are allegedly so traditional, so deeply impressed by neoliberalism and everything, which comes from 
the USA? [http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,20257378,sparing-polska-niemcy-wyborcza-kontra-zeit-on-
line-po.html; 16.11.2016]. In the weekly Die Zeit the debate was published in the series ‘Kumpel 
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Since it is very important in this form of activities not to avoid during such kind 
of discussions so called tough and controversial questions, because “the European 
public sphere can only then appear, when a diagnosis of defi cits and an investiga-
tion of common elements are done together.39 A similar opinion was represented 
by Jürgen Habermas, who said, that the media should not only inform about po-
litical events, but also about the political reactions to them and the controversies, 
which they arouse in other member countries.40
Another example of medial activity, which has had a very positive result and 
made a wide Polish audience familiar with the cultural diversity of the European 
community was a very popular talk show Europa da się lubić [It is possible to 
like Europe],41 which was shown (16 Feb. 2003–21 June 2008) on the TV chan-
nel TVP2, the second channel of Polish public TV. The talk show was a Polish 
version of the French format Union Libre, which in 1998–2002 was broadcast 
by France 2, the second channel of French public TV. The formula of the Polish 
version of the show was based on the participation of foreigners living in Poland, 
who in each of the episodes (each episode dealt with a different subject) in a very 
humorous way told stories about the customs in their native countries. The show 
was supposed to have been a strictly entertaining, but in opinion of Wiesław Go-
dzic was a very educational program.42 The host of the show, Monika Richardson-
Zamachowska, is of the opinion, that it was even more useful for the process of 
European integration, than any other government program.43 This opinion seems 
to be proven by the high ratings, which were maintained for years at a level of 
several millions of viewers and by the huge sympathy and popularity, which the 
majority of the foreign guest of the show enjoy in Poland until today.
Conclusions
Dealing with the subject of the circumstances, which have to be fulfi lled for the 
appearance of the common European public sphere, is should be remembered, 
that the quality of the media content about European issues and its connotation 
depend not only on the journalists’ and editorial staffs’ will, but also – in a sig-
nifi cant dimension – is caused by the events taking place. The involvement and 
attitude of politicians, not only at the European level of politics, but especially of 
domestic and local politicians, as those who are closer to the electorate, have an 
seit 91: Fünf fi ese Fragen an Polen’ [Five nasty questions for the Poles], [http://www.zeit.de/politik/
ausland/2016-06/deutsch-polnische-freundschaft-fragen-an-gazeta-wyborcza; 16.11.2016].
39 H.J. Kleinsteuber, op. cit., p. 40.
40 J. Habermas, op. cit., p. 30.
41 R. Borczyk, Europa da się lubić. 10 lat temu była hitem ramówki [http://natemat.
pl/91657,europa-da-sie-lubic-hit-ramowki-mialby-10-lat; 16.11.2016].
42 B. Sowa, “Europa da się lubić” znika z anteny. Dziennik Polska Europa Świat, 5.05.2008 
[www.dziennik.pl; 16.11.2016].
43 Ibidem.
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enormous impact on the climate and connotation of the media coverage, framing 
etc. concerning European issues, since to the task of journalist fi rst of all belong 
the obligations to record events and to inform about them. Therefore in face of 
such structural and cultural barriers, which were mentioned above and block the 
creation of the European public sphere, it is exactly the element of journalists’ 
and editorial staffs’ will, which may obtain key importance. On this will and the 
general attitude of media professionals to the European integration project will 
depend if, and in what dimension activities will be undertaken, which could sup-
port this European media ‘network’, by the help of which European citizens will 
get the opportunity to learn about and to know each other better.
Meanwhile however there is no reason for being afraid to demand more from 
the politicians too. On their will depends the legal regulations for the media’s 
functioning as well as the frame of interpretation of the consequences of Euro-
pean issues presented by them to the media and through the media to the domestic 
audiences. On their will depends if EU membership will be presented by them 
through the prism of benefi ts or only useless obligations to other EU countries. 
Among the others political actors dealing with the process of European integra-
tion the politicians are absolutely the primary and basic ones, who are responsible 
for the creation of the future of the European project. There is no doubt, that the 
European Union needs many reforms and strengthening of its legitimacy. But 
there is no chance for it without the will and political visions of the politicians. 
The media’s work is secondary. If one day the European project fails the media is 
not to be blamed.
Translated by Titus Ferenc
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